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ABSTRACT 
The Industrial Network Theory aims to describe and explain the business relationships and 
networks in which the focal firm is deeply embedded. One of its major propositions is that 
business relationships somehow influence, to different extents and over time, the focal firm’s 
survival. This pertains to the diverse and time-varying significance of business relationships 
for the focal firm. It has often been implicitly sustained that such significance is strongly 
related to the role played by business relationships and consequently the relationship 
outcomes accruing to the focal firm. The logic underlying the relationship significance 
proposition is outwardly oriented, somewhat overlooking the focal firm’s inside and in 
particular the conspicuous influence of business relationships on what the focal firm does 
competently both within and across its vertical boundaries. Arguably, the (predominantly 
‘functional’) network-based arguments currently advanced represent a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for relationship significance. This conceptual paper tentatively suggests 
that there may be missing a supplementary (essentially internal) explanation supported by 
Competence-based Theories of the Firm. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Still evolving, the Industrial Network Theory (vide Hakansson and Snehota, 1995, Axelsson 
and Easton, 1992, Hakansson, 1982, Ford et al. 1998) attempts to describe and explain the 
inner workings of business networks (and the business relationships and interactions between 
firms, these comprise). At least five major propositions may be pointed out within this theory: 
(i) the existence of business relationships (Hakansson, 1982, Ford, 1980), as well as their 
connectedness (Axelsson and Easton, 1992, Anderson et al. 1994) and uniqueness 
(Hakansson and Snehota, 1995, Ford et al. 1998); (ii) business relationships as a third type of 
governance structure, alternative to hierarchies and markets (Richardson, 1972, Hakansson 
and Johanson, 1993b); (iii) knowledge development via business relationships, i.e., between 
firms (Hakansson and Snehota, 1989, Ford et al. 1986, Hakansson, 1987, Hakansson and 
Snehota, 1995); (iv) firm performance explained by both internal operations and exchange 
processes (Hakansson and Snehota, 1989, Hakansson and Snehota, 1995, Araujo and Easton, 
1996); and (v) the significance of business relationships for the focal firm (henceforth 
‘relationship significance’)
1 (Gadde et al. 2003). Here we will be exclusively concerned with 
the last of these theoretical propositions. The relationship significance proposition is made 
partly explicit in the pervasive contention that ‘business relationships are one of the most 
important resources at the focal firm’s disposal’ (Hakansson, 1987, Hakansson, 1989, Easton 
and Araujo, 1993). As Hakansson and Snehota (1995 : 27) put it: “A [business] relationship is 
one of the resources the company can exploit and use in combination with other resources 
(other relationships) available to the company.”. 
The business relationships that the focal firm establishes, develops, maintains, and terminates 
with counterparts (most notably customers and suppliers) are significant because they 
                                                 
1 The ‘relationship significance’ notion is solely used throughout the paper, understandably substituting for a variety of other, 
equivalent terms such as ‘relationship criticality’, ‘relationship importance’, or ‘relationship relevance’. Arguably, this 
‘black-box’ and elaborate notion denotes ‘the irrefutable hold of business relationships on the focal firm’s survival (and 
growth)’ - this is the meaning generally and implicitly assumed throughout the Industrial Network Theory. We absolutely 
oppose to one anonymous reviewer’s statement that relationship significance is considered in and of itself, i.e., business 
relationships are significant by themselves and not for a specific entity (e.g., the focal firm). Nevertheless, whenever the 
significance of something or someone is presumed, a pertinent question immediately arises: ‘significant for whom?’. 
Significance exists always in relation to someone - likewise, it seems nonsensical to think of relationship significance in 
abstract. That we are sticking to the original (though inferred) signification for relationship significance, and not advancing a 
new one, is supported by Hakansson and Snehota’s (1995: 267) words: “(…) In order to survive and develop you have to 
have counterparts (…).”. Such meaning of relationship significance is also conveyed by Ford and Hakansson (2006a: 22): 
“Companies can choose if and how they want to do something particular relative to a specific counterpart. But they cannot 
choose whether or not to have relations with others, including their suppliers and customers.”. Another anonymous reviewer 
has correctly argued that all the research conducted by the IMP Group is ‘about the various ways in which business 
relationships are significant‘. The Industrial Network Theory surely provides a ‘general picture of the significance of 
business relationships’ (Ford and Hakansson, 2006b: 251). How is that relationship significance explained (i.e., what kind of 
influence is exerted by business relationships) is, in our point of view, an issue that has so far remained largely unclear within 
theory. This is precisely what we are trying to puzzle out with our comprehensive systematization of the underlying network-
based justifications on relationship significance.   4
somehow affect the focal firm’s functioning and development, ultimately influencing its 
survival in business markets (Ford and McDowell, 1999, Kalwani and Narayandas, 1995, 
Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). In the event of deliberatedly terminating its established 
business relationships (or seeing those abruptly ended by counterparts’ will), the focal firm is 
not only somehow impeded to operate and grow, but more importantly, it is doomed to perish 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).
2 
Contrary to what Neoclassical Economics postulates, the existence of the focal firm cannot be 
conceived of without business relationships (see, e.g., Schumpeter, 1954 on a review of 
neoclassical economics' premises). As has been theoretically claimed and empirically 
documented since the mid-1970s, no existing (i.e., surviving) firm is ‘an island in a sea of 
market relations’ (Richardson, 1972, Hakansson and Snehota, 1989, Hakansson, 1982). This 
is why some IMP scholars and researchers stress the ‘strategic importance’ or ‘significance’ 
of business relationships (Hakansson, 1989, Gadde et al. 2003), whereas others refer to 
relationships of ‘strategic status’ (Moller and Halinen, 1999) and to ‘critical’, ‘crucial’, 
‘good’, ‘high-performing’, ‘high quality’, ‘important’, ‘relevant’, ‘significant’, or ‘valuable’ 
business relationships (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995, Cunningham, 1980, Ford et al. 1998, 
Kutschker, 1982, Hakansson, 1987, Johanson and Mattsson, 1987, Gadde and Snehota, 2000, 
Ford and McDowell, 1999). Even Edith Penrose (1959), whose influence is conspicuously 
recognized across Industrial Network Theory (Hakansson and Snehota, 2000, Easton, 1992), 
earlier remarks “[t]he importance attached by firms to the maintenance of their existing 
business relationships (…)” (op. cit. : 147, fn. 2). 
Business relationships are by and large significant for the focal firm (Hakansson and Snehota, 
1995), tough they need not be so inevitably (Ford and Hakansson, 2006a). Nevertheless, at a 
given point in time not all business relationships are significant to the same extent – obviously 
some are more significant for the focal firm than others (Ford and McDowell, 1999). Often, 
only a very limited number of business relationships strongly impact upon the focal firm’s 
survival. “(…) [C]ompanies are likely to have relatively few significant [business] 
                                                 
2 Needless to say, this also applies to the counterparts with which the focal firm develops and maintains business 
relationships. Since we are here adopting the vantage point of the focal firm, the counterpart’s perspective is left latent (albeit 
resembling, at least in part, the former). It seems reasonable to assume the similitude in focal firm’s and counterpart’s 
perspectives since business relationships are usually characterized as symmetric with respect to both parties’ initiative and 
interest in their development and maintenance (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). The focal firm’s standpoint is appropriately 
adopted here, at least if we acknowledge that “[r]elationships are in our view an important structural dimension [of the 
business network] as fundamental as organisations themselves” (Ford and Hakansson, 2006b: 252). However, the focal firm’s 
viewpoint should not be equated with the ‘firm-centred view of the world’ or the ‘single-firm perspective’ so common in 
Management theory and practice, hence presuming the focal firm to be an atomistic entity only concerned with own goals 
and interests and disposing of complete free will in its actions and strategy.   5
relationships.” (Ford and Hakansson, 2006b: 250). Empirically confronted by IMP 
researchers, the recurrent observation that few suppliers and customers account for the 
majority of the focal firm’s total purchases and sales respectively (Hakansson, 1982) - namely 
Pareto’s ‘80/20 rule’ - corroborates this point. Moreover, it is likely that a certain business 
relationship impinges on the focal firm’s survival (i.e., is significant) to different degrees over 
time. That is, relationship significance is changeable over time. Finally, it should be stressed 
that relationship significance cannot be objectively determined, being instead an object of 
perception by the focal firm, particularly its members (Wiley et al. 2006). The perceived 
(though not necessarily real) relationship significance, of course, varies within the focal firm. 
But what is the network-based explanation commonly advanced for relationship significance? 
Surprisingly, the determinants of relationship significance have not been subject to a 
systematic analysis within Industrial Network Theory.
3 Tacitly shared by IMP scholars and 
researchers, the relationship significance assumption is taken-for-granted, often asserted and 
reiterated (see Ford and Hakansson, 2006b) but seldom (if ever) discussed in depth.
4 
The main (conceptual and empirical) foci of Industrial Network Theory are business 
relationships, i.e., those vertical interfirm relationships which are assumed to both (i) have a 
complex substance (i.e., entailing an intricate inter-personal contact pattern) and (ii) perform 
multiple functions for the focal firm (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995: 330). It seems rather 
undisputable that, within Industrial Network Theory, the (composite and multi-purpose) 
business relationships are by definition (highly) significant for the focal firm. Basically, the 
network-based reasoning on this matter is that business relationships do exist ergo they should 
be significant. Empirically the focal firm is willingly related to, and externally dependent on, 
counterparts; expectedly, the business relationships (that allow such multiplex interaction 
with counterparts) are decreed significant for the focal firm. Summing up, relationship 
pervasive existence unequivocally implies relationship significance. As a result, relationship 
                                                 
3 It is quite natural that, within any theory, some issues are taken-for-granted and others, less obvious remain greatly 
unexplored. We believe that Alajoutsijarvi et al.’s (2001) deconstruction and analysis of the metaphorical structure of the 
‘network talk’ (devised and deployed at large by the IMP Group since the mid-1970s) helps to understand why this also 
happens within Industrial Network Theory. They hint that, owing to the dominant metaphors employed in the overall 
theoretical discourse (and in its diverse sub-discourses), some aspects of business networks and relationships are sure to be 
enquired while others are simply ruled out of investigation. Moreover, those metaphors are sure to guide scholars and 
researchers towards certain research questions as well as their acceptable answers. In our viewpoint, relationship significance 
is one of those ‘currently hidden aspects of business networks’ (op. cit.: 104). 
4 To our best knowledge, Wiley et al.’s (2006, 2003) studies on sources of relationship significance in Sweden, Germany, and 
China are a meritorious exception. Such reasons (in their case, as perceived only by suppliers) are basically distilled from the 
functions, benefits and consequent value of business relationships advanced by Walter et al. (2003, 2001). Drawn upon part 
of the extensive IMP2 database, Wiley et al.’s (2006, 2003) empirical research suggested that (i) the prevailing reasons for 
relationship significance are associated with both economic and direct benefits (while indirect and non-economic ones being 
secondary in rankings), and (ii) no substantial differences regarding the way European and Chinese firms characterize their 
significant business relationships can be spotted.   6
significance is an unquestionable presumption of Industrial Network Theory. Blankenburg-
Holm and Johanson (1992: 6, emphasis added) stress this very clearly: “The IMP research 
confirmed the significance of lasting customer-supplier relationships.”. 
Supposedly, relationship significance is strongly associated with the role business 
relationships play for the focal firm (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995, Wilkinson and Young, 
1994). By fulfilling that role (in the form of relationship functions and dysfunctions), 
relationship outcomes (typically more benefits than sacrifices, that is, relationship value) 
accrue to the focal firm (Wilson and Jantrania, 1994, Walter et al. 2003, Walter et al. 2001). 
Even if such relationship value does not result, relationship benefits and sacrifices may be 
respectively greater and/or lower than the ones expected by the focal firm or resulting from 
engaging in other, alternative business relationships (Anderson et al. 1994). In either or both 
of these situations, relationship significance is sure to be contended.
5 
This primarily ‘functional’ explanation for relationship significance is naturally related to the 
focal firm’s outside, in particular its context (i.e., a full-faced environment composed of a 
limited number of distinct, clearly identifiable, and complexly interconnected counterparts) 
(Hakansson and Snehota, 1989). The external focus is a logical consequence of the spatial 
boundaries of Industrial Network Theory, namely interaction, relationship, and network being 
its main units of analysis (check Bacharach, 1989 on theory's spatial and temporal 
boundaries). 
Building upon the theoretical and empirical research of Araujo et al. (2003) and Mota and de 
Castro (2004, 2005) on the strong link between business relationships, competences, and 
boundaries, we advocate that the predominantly functional justification seems a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for relationship significance.
6 Another (internally-focused) theoretical 
explanation - addressing the influence of business relationships not only on what the focal 
firm gets done but also on what it does competently within and across its fuzzy, vertical 
                                                 
5 Industrial Network Theory is clearly not a monolithic body of knowledge, therefore meaning different things to different 
people (Easton, 1992, Hakansson and Snehota, 2000). Notwithstanding, with regard to the network-based justification for 
relationship significance, our standpoint is that a pattern can be disclosed within Industrial Network Theory. Despite knowing 
that we can be accused of artificially imposing such pattern, what seems really unacceptable to us is that no pattern at all can 
be advanced, and consequently that relationship significance is irremediably ‘in the eyes of the beholder’. The pattern 
revealed – that business relationships pay off (i.e., are valuable) per se or comparatively – cannot be reduced to a mere 
economic cost-benefit analysis, as that would imply all benefits and sacrifices resulting from participation in business 
relationships to be objectively and quantitatively measured (Broadway, 1974). That unambiguous quantification of 
relationship benefits and sacrifices is often unfeasible, as latter on shown. 
6 The common network-based reasoning presumes that relationship significance derives from both the nature and role of 
business relationships (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995) - indirectly from the former, directly from the latter. That is, 
relationship role (of course, strongly related to relationship nature) and the resulting relationship value should fully justify 
relationship significance. Our key claim in this paper is a bit different: relationship value only partly explains relationship 
significance.   7
boundaries - seems to be missing. Resorting to so-called Competence-based Theories of the 
Firm (Penrose, 1959) may be, in this sense, quite apposite. According to these theories, the 
focal firm comprises a bundle of direct and indirect competences, which allow it to (know 
how to) do things by itself, as well as (know how to) get things done by others respectively 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982, Loasby, 1998). 
We hold that business relationships are significant for the focal firm not just owing to the 
relationship value (i.e., benefits in excess of sacrifices) they allow it to co-develop and partly 
appropriate. Relationship significance is also explicated because business relationships permit 
the focal firm to (i) improve its internally existing resources and competences or develop new 
ones (isolatedly or jointly), and (ii) access and exploit external, complementary resources and 
competences (possessed by counterparts). These two rationales (in essence network- and 
competence-based) on relationship significance can be combined with ease - despite the latter 
being for the most part neglected within Industrial Network Theory. 
We agree with the overall whats and hows of Industrial Network Theory (i.e., its constructs 
and propositions, respectively), but not completely with its whys (in particular, the logical 
reasoning underlying its relationship significance proposition) (see Whetten, 1989 on the 
main components of a theory). In Wilkinson’s (2003) terminology, one can say that the 
phenomenon in question - relationship significance - is only partially explained with reference 
to the existing state-of-art of theory. In other words, the current network-based arguments on 
relationship significance do not seem to suffice. Understandably, we are not challenging the 
relationship significance in itself but only contesting its apparent taken-for-grantedness and 
the completeness of its underlying network-based arguments. Furthermore, it should be made 
clear that our intent is neither to question nor to evaluate the Industrial Network Theory as a 
whole; we are rather modestly trying to add to it. Our main suggestion is that it can be 
enlightening to append a competence-based reasoning on the aforementioned relationship 
significance proposition. 
This paper is organized as follows. We start in the following section by expounding in detail 
the theoretical support for relationship significance, largely implicit within Industrial Network 
Theory. The thoroughness of such presently posited network-based arguments is then subject 
to an exploratory reflection. A competence-based explanation for relationship significance, 
still in embryonic form, is next advanced. The theoretical and practical implications of further 
enquiry on relationship significance are addressed in the fourth section. And lastly, we present 
our concluding remarks.   8
RELATIONSHIP SIGNIFICANCE AND ITS UNDERLYING ARGUMENTS 
Any attempt to justify relationship significance cannot bypass the centrality of one topic 
within Industrial Network Theory - the role that business relationships play for the focal firm 
as one of its multiple resources. In view of that, business relationships may be considered 
significant owing to their multiple purposes (and associated outcomes) for the focal firm 
(Hakansson and Snehota, 1995, Gadde and Snehota, 2000). 
The focal firm engages in business relationships fundamentally because of appropriate 
‘payoff structures’ that render it favourable consequences or outcomes (Axelrod, 1984). In an 
almost game-theoretical language, one could even claim that the payoff for cooperating 
exceeds that of deflecting (i.e., abandoning current cooperation with a specific partner and 
standing alone) (Kalwani and Narayandas, 1995). In other words, the focal firm deems both 
the economic and non-economic consequences resulting from participation in business 
relationships (i.e., benefits and sacrifices) to be, either per se or comparatively, globally 
satisfactory.
7 Relationship benefits are always weighted against related sacrifices (Hakansson 
and Snehota, 1995) - and the former often seen to exceed the latter. In addition, both of these 
are compared to relationship outcomes either (i) expected (or wished for) by the focal firm or 
(i) ensuing from substitute business relationships or alternative governance mechanisms (such 
as hierarchies and markets).
8 
It pays off for the focal firm to develop and sustain a business relationship with a specific 
counterpart, and consequently that business relationship should be termed significant, for 
either or both of reasons: 
(i)  the relationship benefits (i.e., the ensuing positive outcomes) obtained by the focal 
firm exceed, to some extent, the sacrifices incurred (i.e., relationship costs plus 
deleterious outcomes) (Gadde and Snehota, 2000, Biong et al. 1997, Hakansson and 
Snehota, 1995, Blois, 1999); 
(ii) the relationship benefits are greater and/or relationship sacrifices are lower than 
benefits and sacrifices (a) expected by the focal firm or (b) potentially stemming from 
alternatives, that is, substitute business relationships and conventional governance 
                                                 
7 This holds true, of course, if rationality in business behaviour is overtly assumed (Cyert and March, 1963, Thompson, 
1967). Demsetz (1992) further suggests that business behaviour cannot be properly understood in the absence of that 
presumption. Hakansson and Snehota (1995, chapter 8, fn. 1) highlight this. The rationality of the focal firm (even if 
bounded) seems one of the stepping stones of Industrial Network Theory. 
8 Besides relationship outcomes, (interpretation of) parties’ behaviour are also influential in the development and 
maintenance of the very business relationships (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). For instance, obtaining highly favourable 
relationship outcomes as well as perceiving a great degree of trust and commitment in the counterpart’s conduct can be both 
quite pivotal in the focal firm’s decision to nurture and sustain a business relationship.   9
structures (hierarchies and markets) (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995, Anderson et al. 
1994, Zajac and Olsen, 1993). 
An opening distinction between the two types of outcomes resulting from engagement in 
business relationships - relationship benefits and sacrifices - is timely here. Relationship 
benefits are positive outcomes accruing to the focal firm (Anderson et al. 1994) from the 
fulfilment of relationship functions (Walter et al. 2001, Walter et al. 2003). Relationship 
sacrifices, on the other hand, encompass both the costs incurred by the focal firm 
(indispensable to obtain the benefits referred) (Gadde and Snehota, 2000) and the deleterious 
outcomes that always ensue from being involved in business relationships (Anderson et al. 
1994). Deleterious outcomes normally result from relationship dysfunctions (Walter et al. 
2001, Wiley et al. 2006). If deleterious outcomes accrue to the focal firm then a relationship 
dysfunction must have occurred; yet, we argue, deleterious outcomes can also flow from the 
non-fulfilment of some relationship functions (foreseen or desired by the focal firm), i.e., the 
non-obtainment of (anticipated or wanted) relationship benefits. In this regard, deleterious 
relationship outcomes include not only ensuing harmful consequences, but also the potential 
(yet not attained) positive outcomes. Relationship outcomes are in general highly uncertain – 
these can neither be totally predicted ex ante nor fully measured ex post by the focal firm 
(Ford and Hakansson, 2006a).  
In sum, one may argue that relationship benefits comprise ‘what is gained’ from a business 
relationship (i.e., its positive outcomes), whereas sacrifices consist of ‘what is given out’ (i.e., 
its costs) plus ‘what is lost’ or ‘what was expected or desired to gain’ in that same relationship 
(i.e., its deleterious outcomes). Ford et al. (1998) put it in different terms, seeing relationship 
benefits and sacrifices respectively as what parties (the focal firm and its counterpart) can 
offer to, and demand from, each other. 
The all-inclusive justification advanced within Industrial Network Theory for relationship 
significance – that business relationships pay off either per se or comparatively - can be seen 
indeed as two. The first explanation, which we call ‘minimal’, is about relationship benefits 
outweighing sacrifices; the second explanation, we label ‘differential’, holds that relationship 
benefits and sacrifices are respectively greater and/or lower than the potential ones produced 
via expectations or in alternatives.   10
For the purposes of this paper, we shall only take the totality of the first explanation and a part 
of the second one, to be the network-based argument justifying relationship significance.
9 
This (apparently odd) decision is supported by two sound motives: 
(i)  the second (differential) explanation for relationship significance can only be addressed 
after the first (minimal) is thoroughly examined. In order to compare relationship 
benefits and sacrifices with the benefits and sacrifices resulting from expectations or 
alternatives, inevitably one must first assess the former. As one can easily see, the 
second appraisal begs for the results of the first one; 
(ii) however, that the first (minimal) explanation for relationship significance is always 
inspected before the second (differential) one should not directly lead us to the 
abandonment of (a part of) the latter. What is definitively more troublesome is that the 
evaluation underlying (a part of) the second explanation is forcefully conducive to other, 
distant theories. All the benefits and sacrifices from alternative governance structures 
(i.e., hierarchies and markets) are exhaustively detailed elsewhere – in the Property 
Rights Approach (Hart and Moore, 1990) and Transaction Cost Economics 
(Williamson, 1981) respectively. In short, we are sticking to the ‘pure’ network-based 
rationale, setting aside all arguments that would oblige us to survey other literatures. 
Trimmed from the aforementioned overall justification, the ‘pure’ network-based rationale on 
relationship significance is here the following: a business relationship is significant either 
because its benefits exceed sacrifices (i.e., relationship value is captured by the focal firm) or 
the relationship benefits and sacrifices are respectively greater and/or lower than the ones 
expected by the focal firm or potentially resulting from engagement in other, alternative 
business relationships. 
Let us now discuss in detail the benefits and sacrifices resulting from the focal firm’s 
participation in business relationships, as well as the functions and dysfunctions from which 
they respectively emanate (Walter et al. 2003, Wiley et al. 2006). 
                                                 
9 Only a part of the differential explanation for relationship significance is deliberately left out of the remaining discussion, in 
particular the one that does not categorically spring from Industrial Network Theory - related to the potential benefits and 
sacrifices ensuing from alternative governance structures. Our primary interest, if it needs to be recalled, lies only in 
Industrial Network Theory. It is outside the scope of this paper to determine all the benefits and sacrifices of vertically 
integrating, and of employing transactional relations with, counterparts. The thorough discussion of the differential 
explanation is therefore postponed, preferably becoming object of later research. This thoughtful delimitation of theoretical 
focus can be with considerable ease pointed out as a limitation of our study - even though it bears negligible (if any) 
penalties, neither impairing nor invalidating our primary claims of, in particular that a competence-based justification on 
relationship significance may be lacking.   11
Functions and dysfunctions of business relationships 
Relationship (interlinked) nature and role. Business relationships can be characterized in 
accordance with two primary dimensions (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995, Wilkinson and 
Young, 1994): (i) their nature (or substance) and  (ii) their role (or function). It is often 
argued that the latter is contingent on the former (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). That is, 
some relationship substance – in the form of intense activity links, resource ties, and actor 
bonds - must exist if functions are to be performed. Relationship functions are effected 
because there exists a reasonable degree of involvement and commitment by both parties and 
their resources and activities are being employed and coordinated respectively (Walter et al. 
2001, Walter et al. 2003). In addition, there is also some degree of mutuality (or 
compatibility) concerning both parties’ intentions, plans, and interests (Anderson et al. 1994). 
In principle, only high-involvement (i.e., costly, ‘substantial’)  business relationships are 
certain to perform valuable functions for the focal firm (Gadde and Snehota, 2000, Araujo et 
al. 1999). But that is not always the case, and therefore low-involvement (‘non-substantial’) 
relationships may also accomplish a role, for instance, in the future (ibid.). Multiple features 
of business relationships (such as high degrees of trust, commitment, and interdependence, or 
an extended scope of cooperation efforts and interpersonal contacts) are crucial to functions’ 
fulfilment; unfortunately, even with a strong substance, either some (expected or desired) 
relationship functions are not performed at all or relationship dysfunctions are seldom 
avoidable (Walter et al. 2001, Wiley et al. 2006). 
Empirical research has identified some relationship-specific factors as preconditions for 
functions’ fulfilment: (i) trust, commitment, and satisfaction (i.e., relationship quality); and 
(ii) high degrees of adaptations (Walter and Ritter, 2003). In addition, Walter et al. (2003) 
empirically found that the fulfilment of (both direct and indirect) functions is a strong 
determinant of (perceived) relationship quality. A reciprocal, reinforcing effect between 
relationship function and substance thus seems to be posited. Seemingly, the role of business 
relationships shapes their own nature (and not just the other way around) (Araujo et al. 1999). 
Relationship functions.  Both  primary and secondary functions are attributed to business 
relationships (Hakansson and Johanson, 1993a, Anderson et al. 1994). Relationship functions 
are labelled ‘primary’, ‘direct’, or ‘first-order’ when relationship benefits and sacrifices are 
both immediately obtained by the focal firm or ensue independently of connected business 
relationships or other network actors. On the other hand, relationship functions are said   12
‘secondary’, ‘network’, ‘indirect’, or ‘second-order’ if benefits and sacrifices are only 
attained in the future or uniquely depend on the focal firm’s connected relationships or actors 
(Walter et al. 2001). There is no such thing as a most advantageous type of relationship 
function. “(…) [I]n a given relationship, secondary functions can be as important as primary 
ones, or even more so” (Anderson et al. 1994: 3). 
We suggest that six main functions may be set forth to group the diversity of roles that 
business relationships play both directly and indirectly for the focal firm (Wilkinson and 
Young, 1994, Araujo et al. 1999, Hakansson and Snehota, 1995, Walter et al. 2001, Walter et 
al. 2003, Wiley et al. 2006, Hakansson and Johanson, 1993a, Hakansson, 1987, Hakansson, 
1989): (i) access; (ii) control; (iii) efficiency; (iv) innovation; (v) stability; and (vi) strategy. 
These are promptly described. 
Access function.  The focal firm is not a self-sufficient and atomistic entity, being rather 
deeply enmeshed in networks of relationships and largely dependent on external resources 
and activities for survival and growth (Thompson, 1967, Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Focal 
firm’s resources and activities extend beyond its traditional ownership-delimited boundaries 
(Araujo and Easton, 1996). As suggested in the Actors-Resources-Activities (ARA) model 
(Hakansson, 1987, Hakansson, 1989, Hakansson and Johanson, 1992), business relationships 
allow the focal firm to access other network actors (prominently firms) and later exploit their 
(complementary) resources and activities. Generally, the resources possessed, and the 
activities performed, by the focal firm are both seen as a result of its history and only 
changeable slowly and at great cost (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). However, the Industrial 
Network Theory has shown that it is always possible (and probably faster and less costly) for 
the focal firm to change the resources and activities it has access to and exploits, by 
simultaneously disentangling from existing business relationships and initiating new ones 
with other actors (Ford et al. 1998). 
The resources and activities of the focal firm are essentially limited, dormant, and 
fragmentary. Ford et al. (op. cit.: 46, emphasis in original) says this very clearly: “A company 
is a collection of inert resources [and activities] that are only activated through interaction 
with others and (…) acquire their value when they become useful to others. Companies 
interact with each other and develop relationships in order to exploit and enhance their own 
resources [and activities] and to gain the benefit of those of others.”. Intra- and especially 
inter-firm resource and activity complementarity is a conspicuous feature of business markets 
(Johanson and Mattsson, 1987).   13
Control function. The focal firm can use its business relationships as means of influence over 
counterparts, thereby increasing its network control (Hakansson, 1987, Hakansson, 1989). 
Through business relationships, the focal firm can: (i) build new, or strengthen (i.e., preserve 
or alter) its existing, position(s) in the network (Mattsson and Johanson, 1992); (ii) influence 
counterparts (and their respective network theories); (iii) change business relationships (e.g., 
by ending business relationships, establishing new, or changing the substance of existing 
ones), consequently somewhat altering network structures, (Mattsson and Johanson, 1992); 
(iv) restructure the web of interdependences at the activity and resource levels (e.g., reducing 
its dependence on counterparts’ resources and activities or increasing counterparts’ 
dependence on its own resources and activities (Mattsson and Johanson, 1992); (v) enhance 
its own reputation or attractiveness as a business partner in the network (Anderson et al. 
1994); and (vi) promote suitable network change or instead block undesired changes initiated 
elsewhere, e.g., by counterparts (Lundgren, 1992). 
Efficiency function. Hakansson and Snehota (1995: 394) claim that “[f]rom the point of view 
of a company the benefits of relationships often consist in their positive consequences for 
company costs”. The focal firm’s efficiency - in performing its own activities and deploying 
resources - was usually regarded as an internal technical matter; however, such efficiency is to 
a large degree contingent on the focal firm’s established business relationships with 
counterparts. Efficiency gains (i.e., reducing either production costs or transaction costs or 
both) can be obtained by the focal firm via engagement in business relationships. By 
interlinking its activities with those of counterparts, the focal firm is likely to discover and 
attain (more) efficient ways of producing and transacting (Hakansson, 1982, Araujo et al. 
1999). As Hakansson and Snehota (2000: 42) point out, “(…) relationships can be a way to 
reach a higher level of efficiency in the combination of production and transactions”. 
Innovation function. Resource and competence development has been usually thought to 
occur within firms (Dierickx and Cool, 1989, Wernerfelt, 1984). Such development, however, 
has been empirically found to take place to a large extent between firms, i.e., via the business 
relationships they often maintain between themselves (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995, 
Hakansson, 1987). As the focal firm combines its resources and competences with those of 
counterparts, extant knowledge is certain to be shared and new knowledge jointly created 
(Penrose, 1959). By interacting, new ways of employing and combining resources and 
competences may be found by the focal firm (e.g., resources’ recognized dimensions may be 
exploited differently or previously unknown dimensions discovered, and new uses and   14
purposes for extant resources can be advanced) and even new resources and competences may 
be co-developed (Araujo et al. 1999, Hakansson and Snehota, 1989). 
Business relationships allow the creative leveraging of both resource and competence 
heterogeneity - and this heterogeneity is the outcome of both internal operations and exchange 
processes taking place (Hakansson, 1987, Easton and Araujo, 1993, Penrose, 1959). 
Stability function. As business relationships develop over time, mutual trust and commitment 
are gradually increased (Ford, 1980), and interfirm teaching and learning becomes greater 
(Hakansson et al. 1999, Araujo et al. 1999). Business relationships are frequently used by the 
focal firm as information conduits or channels (Anderson et al. 1994, Hakansson, 1987), 
through which knowledge is shared with counterparts. By virtue of that, the focal firm is able 
to increase the knowledge of what is beyond its immediate network horizon (Anderson et al. 
1994, Hakansson and Snehota, 1995), hence greatly reducing its environmental uncertainty 
(Easton, 1992). 
Any business relationship always implies some degree of control by the focal firm over its 
counterpart and therefore, some extent of control over the environment (stability) is attained 
(Hakansson and Snehota, 1989). The focal firm is likely to deal better with the environmental 
complexity it faces (Hakansson, 1982). “Developing continuous, ‘dense’ relationships with 
others seems to be a way to cope with the complexities and ambiguities which any company 
is facing in a [business] market.” (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995: 11). By keeping both 
flexibility and redundancy in its business relationships (i.e., engaging in both strong and 
weak, similar and different relationships with counterparts), the focal firm becomes more 
capable to thrive in the increasingly complex and dynamic business networks in which it is 
deeply embedded (Araujo et al. 1999, Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). 
Strategy function. To some degree, business relationships impinge on the focal firm’s strategy 
in the business markets in which it operates (Ford et al. 1998). The focal firm devises and puts 
in practice its strategy, with and mostly through the business relationships that it establishes, 
develops, maintains, and terminates with counterparts. “(…) [S]trategy development in 
business markets centres on, is affected by, and is implemented through relationships” (op. 
cit.: 75). Clearly, business relationships are one of the main instruments that the focal firm 
musters to effect its network strategy (if not the primary one), i.e., the way the focal firm: (i) 
relates to its changing context (Hakansson and Snehota, 1989); (ii) manages 
interdependences at actor, resource, and activity levels (Gadde et al. 2003); and (iii) deals   15
with the paradoxes inherent in business markets (e.g., influencing, and being influenced by, 
counterparts) (Hakansson and Ford, 2002). 
Two final aspects are worthy of comment. Firstly, relationship functions may be fulfilled at 
diverse levels (Anderson et al. 1994, Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). Put differently, the 
outcomes of functions’ fulfilment (i.e., relationship benefits) are sensed by the focal firm at 
actor, resource, or activity levels. With respect to the six major functions of business 
relationships here identified, the Access, Control, and Strategy functions are fulfilled at all 
levels, whereas Stability, Innovation, and Efficiency functions are respectively performed at 
actor, resource, and activity levels (see Table 1 below). 
Main functions of business relationships   
Levels of 
fulfilment 
Access Control  Efficiency Innovation Stability  Strategy 
Actor            
Resource          
Activity            
Table 1 - Levels at which main relationship functions are fulfilled 
Source: Own authorship, inferred from Walter et al. (2003, 2001) 
Secondly, at a given point in time, at least one (but not necessarily all) of these six functions 
are accomplished in every business relationship that the focal firm is engaged in (Walter et al. 
2003). If participation in business relationships can be justified with diverse motives, more 
than one relationship function is likely to be fulfilled at some point in time. Moreover, the 
fulfilment of relationship functions is likely to vary over time. For example, as the focal 
firm’s relationship with customer A evolves, the (previously accomplished) Access function 
may be replaced by Innovation. Inasmuch as it is very unlikely that a business relationship 
fulfils (at least in a certain point in time) all functions expected or desired by the focal firm 
(Walter et al. 2003, Wiley et al. 2006), one might refer to the non-fulfilment of functions and 
partly, to dysfunctions. 
Relationship dysfunctions. A business relationship may be labelled dysfunctional if it either (i) 
does not fulfil some functions (expected or desired by the focal firm) or (ii) precludes the 
fulfilment of (expected or desired) functions in other, connected relationships. For instance, 
since the focal firm’s relationship with customer A does not permit the access to customer B 
(i.e., not fulfils the Access function) or hinders Innovation in its relationship with supplier C, 
it is deemed dysfunctional. In short, if some sacrifices are borne by the focal firm (i.e., the   16
existence of deleterious outcomes or the absence of positive outcomes, expected or desired), 
then a relationship dysfunction must have ocurred (Wiley et al. 2006). But what relationship 
functions can be identified? And how or why do they occur? 
Our stance is that for each relationship function fulfilled, it is very likely that a dysfunction 
follows. For instance, as the focal firm obtains a higher degree of control in the network 
(through fulfilment of the relationship Control function), there is a high likelihood that its 
counterparts also enhance their network control (partly at the expense of the former). That is, 
the focal firm does not gain the total network control it potentially could – some of that 
control is necessarily given to its counterparts. Or, as the focal firm copes better with the 
surrounding environmental complexity (via the relationship Stability function), some of its 
own stability is necessarily ‘lost’ (i.e., ‘given’ to counterparts). The same thing may happen 
for each other main function potentially carried out in business relationships. Hence we may 
allude to six major relationship dysfunctions: (i) access; (ii) control; (iii) efficiency; (iv) 
innovation; (v) stability; and (vi) strategy. 
In sum, relationship functions and dysfunctions are concomitant elements, concurrently 
performed in business relationships. The focal firm benefits from being involved in business 
relationships, but in return it has to cede (i.e., allowing or fostering its counterparts’ gains). In 
business markets, it is not just a matter of receiving: one has forcefully to give out, at least if 
it truly wants to profit. This resembles Hakansson and Ford’s (2002) reasoning on the 
network paradoxes. 
Connectedness of relationship functions and dysfunctions. Since business relationships are 
directly and indirectly connected to each other, it seems plausible that their functions and 
dysfunctions are interrelated (see Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). For instance, the Innovation 
function carried out in the focal firm’s relationship with customer A may be dependent on, as 
well as positively influence, the Innovation functions fulfilled in both the former’s 
relationship with customer B and the latter’s relationship with supplier C (a focal firm’s 
competitor). Alternatively, the mere existence of the focal firm’s (supposedly dysfunctional) 
business relationship with supplier D may preclude the Innovation function in its relationship 
with supplier E. It does not seem absolutely necessary that only relationship functions and 
dysfunctions of the same kind are positively or negatively connected, as in the given 
examples. The mentioned Innovation function of the focal firm’s relationship with A may 
depend on, and affect, both the Access and Efficiency functions in its business relationships 
with B.   17
Benefits and sacrifices from participating in business relationships 
As mentioned earlier, relationship benefits are the positive outcomes resulting from the 
fulfilment of relationship functions. Relationship sacrifices, conversely, comprise the costs 
incurred to attain such benefits plus the negative outcomes stemming from either relationship 
dysfunctions or the mere non-fulfilment of relationship functions. Plainly, benefits propel the 
focal firm into business relationships whilst sacrifices may be seen as factors inhibiting their 
formation (Biong et al. 1997). 
Relationship benefits. Six primary positive outcomes for the focal firm, from fulfilling main 
relationship functions, may be advanced: (i) accessing other actors in the network, and 
potentially exploiting their resources and activities (complementary to those it internally 
possesses and performs) (Hakansson and Snehota, 1989, Johanson and Mattsson, 1987, 
Hakansson, 1989, Hakansson, 1982); (ii) exercising and/or augmenting its influence and 
control in the network (e.g., altering or reinforcing its network position, changing the 
dominant network theory, restructuring interdependences at activity and resource levels to its 
own advantage, enhancing its own reputation and attractiveness, or promoting and blocking 
network change) (Hakansson and Johanson, 1992, Johanson and Mattsson, 1987, Anderson et 
al. 1994); (iii) attaining efficiency gains (i.e., reducing its production and transaction costs) 
(Hakansson, 1982, Hakansson, 1989, Johanson and Mattsson, 1987); (iv) innovating (i.e., 
improving the existing use of resources, discovering new uses for extant resources, or even 
developing new resources and competences) (Hakansson and Snehota, 2000, Hakansson, 
1987); (v) learning (i.e., coping better with, or reducing, the surrounding environmental 
uncertainty) (Hakansson, 1987, Hakansson, 1989, Hakansson, 1982); and (vi) strategizing 
(i.e., devising and putting into practice its network strategy) (Gadde et al. 2003, Hakansson 
and Snehota, 1989). 
Relationship sacrifices: costs plus deleterious outcomes. Three relationship costs are usually 
born by the focal firm: (i) opportunity costs related to its established business relationships, in 
particular the adaptations made within these (Gadde and Snehota, 2000, Hakansson, 1982); 
(ii) relationship handling costs (i.e., costs of establishing, developing, maintaining, and 
terminating each of its business relationships) (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995, Blois, 1999, 
Gadde and Snehota, 2000); and (iii) network handling costs (i.e., overhead costs incurred with 
all of its business relationships) (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995, Gadde and Snehota, 2000).   18
With respect to deleterious outcomes accruing to the focal firm because of its engagement in 
business relationships, one may point out at least three: (i) lock-in effects (e.g., the focal 
firm’s established business relationships may preclude the development of other relationships) 
(Araujo and Harrison, 2002, Mota and de Castro, 2005, Hakansson and Snehota, 1995); (ii) 
being more subject to the opportunistic behaviour of counterparts (e.g., free-riding and hold-
up problems), in parallel with its growing dependency on others and the resulting loss of own 
autonomy (Hakansson, 1982, Biong et al. 1997); and (iii) various others harmful 
consequences (e.g., damaging effects of the focal firm’s relationship with a certain 
counterpart on its positions, reputation, and attractiveness in the network) (Anderson et al. 
1994, Mattsson, 1989). 
Additionally, as we have stressed before, deleterious outcomes may include the non-
attainment of positive relationship outcomes (either predicted or wanted) by the focal firm, 
i.e., what it loses in counterparts’ favour (Wiley et al. 2006). The benefits ensuing from 
participation in a business relationship are somehow divided between the parties involved 
(Wilson and Jantrania, 1994). On some occasions, the focal firm gets less relationship benefits 
than the ones it expected or desired to obtain. In a sense, deleterious outcomes may include 
the relationship benefits obtained by counterparts, at the focal firm‘s expense. For example, 
Efficiency and Innovation benefits captured by counterpart A (to the disfavour of the focal 
firm) can be considered, from the latter’s perspective, to be relationship sacrifices. 
Relatedness of relationship benefits and sacrifices.  There is always a certain degree of 
uncertainty (and ambiguity) about the overall sacrifices and benefits actually accruing from a 
business relationship (Ford, 1980). That uncertainty, more prominent concerning relationship 
sacrifices than benefits, stems from two aspects. Firstly, relationship benefits and sacrifices 
are in general difficult to identify, let alone accurately calculate (Hakansson and Snehota, 
1995). And secondly, relationship benefits and sacrifices are both likely to vary across the 
parties to a business relationship (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). That is, a business 
relationship may bear more or different benefits (or sacrifices) for the focal firm than for its 
counterpart, or vice-versa. 
Diverse benefits and sacrifices are typically expected in different business relationships 
(Wiley et al. 2006). Previously, we claimed that the benefits obtained and the sacrifices 
incurred depend on the substance of the business relationship (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995), 
which is in turn contingent upon the posture adopted by, and consequently the input of, the   19
focal firm (Gadde and Snehota, 2000, Araujo et al. 1999). Different relationship postures (i.e., 
degrees of involvement) are sure to be conducive to contrasting benefits and sacrifices (ibid.). 
Relationship benefits and sacrifices are not unconnected (Gadde and Snehota, 2000); the 
former are not obtained automatically, easily or for free (op. cit.), being partly dependent on 
the latter’s existence (Blois, 1999, Araujo et al. 1999). Much time and sacrifices (at least 
costs) are needed, before relationship benefits can be reaped by the focal firm (Hakansson and 
Snehota, 1995, Blois, 1999). Attaining benefits often requires a high degree of involvement 
by the focal firm in the corresponding business relationship. It is not axiomatic, however, that 
only high-involvement business relationships lead to large benefits and entail low sacrifices 
(e.g., consider the case in which the counterpart lacks motivation and interest in maintaining 
the relationship) (Gadde and Snehota, 2000, Araujo et al. 1999). On the other hand, a low-
involvement business relationship may permit (at least theoretically) the focal firm to attain a 
great deal of benefits, while incurring only reduced sacrifices (ibid.). The possibility of 
temporary free-riding (i.e., obtaining benefits without sacrificing) can never be, of course, 
ruled out. Different amounts of sacrifices may contribute to similar relationship benefits 
whilst equivalent relationship sacrifices may imply diverse benefits (Hakansson and Snehota, 
1995). 
Lastly, it should be stressed that the benefits and sacrifices of a certain business relationship 
hinge upon the substance of, and role fulfilled by, other connected business relationships 
(Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). That is, relationship benefits and sacrifices (like the 
relationship functions and dysfunctions from which they originate) are affected by the 
connectedness of business relationships. 
Relationship benefits and sacrifices: which to emphasize? Relationship benefits and sacrifices 
are recognized as two sides of the same coin (Hakansson and Snehota, 2000). Industrial 
Network Theory, however, seems to place more emphasis on the benefits than on relationship 
sacrifices – the ‘dark side’, ‘burden’, or ‘liability’ of business relationships (Hakansson and 
Snehota, 1998, Ford et al. 1998) is commonly left out of the theoretical discussion 
(Alajoutsijarvi et al. 2001). Both benefits ensuing from, and the functions fulfilled by, 
business relationships are largely addressed within Industrial Network Theory (Walter et al. 
2003, Walter et al. 2001). By contrast, relationship sacrifices and dysfunctions are, almost in 
the same proportion, overlooked (Walter et al. 2001). This reinforces the widespread notion 
that the benefit side of business relationships is more important than their sacrifice side 
(Hakansson and Snehota, 1995).   20
That Industrial Network Theory does not give too much emphasis to the deleterious outcomes 
potentially resulting from being engaged in business relationships (e.g., dependency and 
opportunistic behaviour problems), is probably because such outcomes are invariably ‘part of 
the game’ – exactly what Hakansson and Ford’s (2002) network paradoxes suggest. It is in the 
focal firm’s best interest to be more concerned with relationship benefits than with related 
sacrifices. Hakansson and Snehota (1995: 396) convey this in clear terms: “(…) 
[E]conomizing on the costs of handling relationships is important but exploiting the potential 
relationship benefits is even more important. It is the benefits side of relationships and not the 
costs [and overall sacrifices] they entail that appear to be the critical variable in a management 
perspective.”. 
 
Relationship significance: diverse, changeable, and connected 
Before advancing to the key point of our paper, a few remarks need to be made about the 
statics and dynamics, and connectedness of relationship significance. At a given point in time, 
it is unlikely that two business relationships are equally significant for the focal firm – a 
relationship significance continuum, ranging from ‘insignificant’ business relationships 
through ‘lowly significant’ and ‘averagely significant’ to ‘highly significant ones, may be 
thus presumed (Sousa and de Castro, 2004). In addition, each business relationship is bound 
to see its significance for the focal firm vary over time. The time-varying (i.e., actual vs. 
potential) relationship significance is contended (op. cit.). 
In view of our preceding contentions, the network-based justification for relationship 
significance can be directly traced to the role played by, and the outcomes resulting from, 
business relationships. Either because (i) ensuing relationship benefits exceed sacrifices (i.e., 
relationship value is co-created and partly captured by the focal firm) or (ii) relationship 
benefits and sacrifices are respectively greater and/or lower than the ones expected by the 
focal firm or resulting from substitute business relationships, relationship significance 
follows. 
Some relationship outcomes - in particular the non-economic, mediate, and indirect ones - are 
difficult, if not impossible, to quantify or measure fairly. At most, these outcomes can be 
subjectively estimated by the focal firm (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). Even if all 
relationship benefits and sacrifices were totally quantifiable, the perceptual, rationally limited 
character of the individual actors assessing them within the focal firm (Weick, 1969, Weick,   21
1995, Cyert and March, 1963) would, as a consequence, lead forcefully to personal and 
different valuations (Blois, 1999). The dual ownership of business relationships, and 
consequently the troublesome division of their ensuing value between the parties involved 
(i.e., which benefits and sacrifices ensue to the focal firm and which leftover ones accrue to its 
counterpart), also add to the difficulty of quantifying relationship outcomes (Hakansson and 
Snehota, 1995). By virtue of the great intangibility of relationship outcomes, relationship 
significance can only be perceived  by the focal firm, instead of objectively determined. 
Accordingly, business relationships are sensed by the focal firm to be more or less significant, 
or not significant at all. 
The final point to make is that relationship connectedness also bears upon relationship 
significance. Therefore, connectedness always needs to be taken into account when assessing 
the relationship significance (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). Seemingly, the significance of a 
focal firm’s specific relationship is often related to the significance of its other (directly or 
indirectly connected) business relationships. This is but the corollary of relationship benefits 
and sacrifices, as well as the functions and dysfunctions from which they originate, being 
allegedly somehow interrelated. For example, the benefits (from functions’ fulfilment) in 
excess of sacrifices (accruing either from dysfunctions’ fulfilment, non-fulfilment of 
functions, or both) attained by the focal firm in its business relationship with customer A may 
be strongly associated with the benefits and sacrifices derived (and hence with the functions 
and dysfunctions performed) in its connected relationships with other counterparts (e.g., 
customer B and supplier C).   22
IS RELATIONSHIP SIGNIFICANCE SUFFICIENTLY EXPLAINED? 
According to the above-mentioned network-based rationale, either (i) relationship benefits 
exceeding sacrifices (i.e., relationship value is appropriated by the focal firm) or (ii) 
relationship benefits and sacrifices being respectively greater and/or lower than the ones 
expected or resulting from engaging in alternative business relationships are implicitly 
claimed sine qua non for relationship significance. In our viewpoint, these arguments set a 
minimum, i.e., constitute a necessary but not sufficient condition for advocating relationship 
significance. As an illustrative example, one may think of the business relationship that the 
focal firm holds with counterpart A (one of its suppliers). Such business relationship may be 
perceived as highly significant by the focal firm even though accruing sacrifices far outweigh 
attained benefits (i.e., relationship value is only captured by A) or relationship benefits and 
sacrifices are respectively lower and/or greater than the ones expected or resulting from 
engagement in substitute business relationships. In this case, the focal firm’s perception of 
significance concerning its business relationship with A is surely supported by other motives. 
At present, the dominant theoretical justification underlying the relationship significance 
proposition is (i) functional – primarily addressing actual and potential relationship benefits 
and sacrifices – and, more importantly, (ii) ‘externally oriented’, i.e., essentially focused on 
the focal firm’s (interaction with its) context (see, e.g., Hakansson and Snehota, 1989). This 
external, or interfirm, orientation derives directly from the spatial assumptions of Industrial 
Network Theory, i.e., its main units of analysis being interaction, relationship, and network. 
An ‘internally-oriented’ (intrafirm) theoretical explanation for relationship significance seems 
to be lacking. 
By drawing on the novel, both theoretical and empirical works of Araujo et al. (2003) and 
Mota and Castro (2004, 2005) – that address the link between business relationships and the 
focal firm’s competenes and vertical boundaries – we contend that the impact of business 
relationships on the focal firm’s resources and competences (internally and externally 
available) and consequently on the delimitation over time of its blurring, vertical boundaries 
needs to be explicitly recognized as a possible condition for relationship significance. So far, 
this ‘competence-based’ justification has not been much addressed by IMP scholars and 
researchers. 
Competence-based Theories of the Firm (Penrose, 1959, Nelson and Winter, 1982) postulate 
the focal firm as a set of internal competences (direct and indirect), profoundly enmeshed in a   23
wider network of external competences (direct and indirect). “A [focal] firm’s capabilities and 
resources are seen as embodied in evolving networks of interdependence both within the firm 
and within the network structure in which it is embedded.” (Araujo and Easton, 1996: 376). 
The focal firm has necessarily limited direct competences (i.e., knows how to do a limited 
number things due to specialization) and, consequently, needs to possess indirect 
competences (i.e., knows how to get things done by others) (Loasby, 1998). In this sense, 
continually establishing, nurturing, and maintaining business relationships to access and 
exploit needed (external, complementary) competences is fundamental for the focal firm. 
Likewise, the Industrial Network Theory recurrently advocates that all external resources and 
competences accessed and exploited by the focal firm are inextricably related to its potential 
and actual business relationships, i.e., the business relationships it is capable of (and de facto 
chooses to) establish, develop, and sustain with several counterparts (Hakansson, 1987, 
Hakansson, 1989).
10 In a knowledge-based terminology (Nelson and Winter, 1982, Loasby, 
1998), one may claim that what the focal firm gets done by others is (at least in part) 
determined by its current business relationships.
11 On the other hand, we may contend the 
following: what the focal firm does competently within and across its vertical boundaries - its 
core and relational  or  network competences (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990, Ritter, 1999, 
Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999) - is bound to be largely a consequence of the business 
relationships and purely transactional relations it is unable or, if capable, decides not to 
engage in (Araujo et al. 1999). 
 
The emerging competence-based explanation for relationship significance 
Sousa and de Castro (2004) suggest that the focal firm (i) comprises a bundle of internal 
competences, assets, and dynamic capabilities, whilst (ii) being deeply embroiled in its 
environment (hence relying, via business relationships, on external competences and 
resources) (Barney, 1986, Dierickx and Cool, 1989, Teece et al. 1997, Langlois and 
                                                 
10 The partial influence of business relationships on what the focal firm gets done by others is somehow incorporated in the 
arguments currently advanced within Industrial Network Theory to explain the relationship significance, under the guise of 
‘access to, and exploitation of, external resources and activities’ (the Access function earlier described). We thank Hakan 
Hakansson and Lars Mikkelsen for pointing this out. 
11 The focal firm also gets things done via arm’s-length relations with counterparts. What the focal firm gets done by others is 
a direct reflection of the business relationships (as well as the purely transactional relations) it is able and chooses to initiate, 
develop, and sustain with several counterparts. Furthermore, the resources and competences subcontracted by the focal firm 
across the market (i.e., accessed and exploited via arm’s-length relations) are themselves likely to be a consequence of what it 
is unable of, or rather chooses not to, access and exploit through business relationships.   24
Robertson, 1995). Looking at their tentative competence-based framework (op. cit.: 15), two 
sound questions immediately crop up: 
(i)  Do business relationships contribute to the development, maintenance, and renewal of 
the focal firm’s internal competences and assets? 
(ii) Do business relationships contribute to the access, exploitation, and creation of the 
focal firm’s needed (external, complementary) competences and resources?
12 
If the answer to both these questions is a ‘yes’ - as theoretical and empirical research 
conducted within Industrial Network Theory and elsewhere seems to corroborate (Araujo et 
al. 2003, Mota and de Castro, 2004, Mota and de Castro, 2005, Langlois and Robertson, 1995, 
Barney, 1999) - then relationship significance is strongly associated with (i) what the focal 
firm does competently by itself and (ii) what it gets done competently by others, particularly 
via business relationships. In short, relationship significance may be justified by the notorious 
(yet unuttered) role that business relationships play on defining over time the vertical 
boundaries of the focal firm. The focal firm’s vertical boundaries bridge it to, and buffer it 
from, both suppliers (upstream) and customers (downstream) (Araujo et al. 2003, Thompson, 
1967). Basically, these boundaries separate what the focal firm does from what it gets done by 
others (via business relationships, or purely transactional relations, with counterparts). 
The delimitation of the shifting and fuzzy vertical boundaries of the focal firm cannot be 
resumed to a series of discrete ‘make-or-buy’ decisions. Albeit usually seen as static, 
independent, and dichotomous (Williamson, 1975), a network-based vantage point suggests 
that such decisions are closely connected to each other over time and, more importantly, 
incorporate a third option (‘access’) (Gibbons, 2001a, Gibbons, 2001b). Boundary decisions 
are hence about making, buying, or accessing, i.e., vertically integrating, engaging in arm’s-
length relations with, or developing business relationships with, counterparts respectively. 
In addition to the network-based rationale alluded to before (to wit, appropriation of 
relationship value by the focal firm or relationship benefits and sacrifices being respectively 
greater and/or lower than the ones expected or ensuing from substitute business 
relationships), the relationship significance proposition of Industrial Network Theory may be 
theoretically and empirically supported by the influence that business relationships 
demonstrate on what the focal firm competently does and gets done, i.e., on the evolution of 
                                                 
12 This question is one clearly put forward (and positively answered) by Industrial Network Theory, in particular its ARA 
Model (Hakansson, 1987, Hakansson, 1989, Hakansson and Johanson, 1992).   25




                                                 
13 The liaison between the competences and vertical boundaries of the focal firm has been object of intense theoretical and 
empirical research (see, e.g., Langlois and Robertson, 1995). Owing to the costliness of developing competences by oneself, 
these play a key role in determining focal firm’s boundaries (Barney, 1999). An additional conceptual link – from focal 
firm’s business relationships through its competences to its vertical boundaries - seems to be propounded (Araujo et al. 
2003).   26
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ENQUIRYING RELATIONSHIP 
SIGNIFICANCE 
Business relationships are sources of both opportunities and constraints, thus being 
simultaneously rewarding and demanding for the focal firm (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). 
Multiple benefits accrue from the participation of the focal firm in business relationships but 
these do not come rapidly or freely (Blois, 1999). Inescapably, some sacrifices must be 
incurred (Ravald and Gronroos, 1996). Being involved in business relationships is always 
resource-intensive, even if to varying extents (Gadde and Snehota, 2000, Araujo et al. 1999). 
Relationship benefits and sacrifices are both of them unavoidable (Walter et al. 2001, Walter 
et al. 2003). Relationship benefits are often sensed to outweigh sacrifices, and relationship 
value is thus co-created and partially appropriated by the focal firm (Wilson and Jantrania, 
1994, Ravald and Gronroos, 1996) – in such cases, business relationships are seen as (more or 
less) significant. Business relationships may be significant still, when ensuing sacrifices 
exceed (or are seen as roughly equal to) benefits, if those benefits and sacrifices are 
respectively greater and/or lower than the ones resulting from the focal firm’s expectations or 
alternatives (i.e., substitute business relationships, hierarchies, or markets). Otherwise, 
business relationships may be deemed insignificant (or worthless) for the focal firm. 
The focal firm needs to prioritize its business relationships (Gadde et al. 2003, Hakansson and 
Snehota, 1995), since these (i) differ between themselves, and over time, in their relative 
degree of significance and (ii) can only be established, nurtured, maintained, and even ended 
through large and incremental investment of resources (i.e., adaptations) (Hakansson, 1982). 
As business relationships are not equally significant (neither presently nor over time) and the 
focal firm is endowed with limited resources (and consequently, can be highly involved with 
only a limited number of counterparts), “(…) there is a need for giving certain relationships 
priority over others” (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995: 131).
14 Different priorities should be 
assigned to (and attained in) differently significant business relationships. That is to say, the 
focal firm has to be selective in the development and sustenance of its business relationships. 
                                                 
14 Prioritize business relationships boils down to ‘single out the significant ones’ (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995: 125). 
Prioritizing, however, is not only about giving both high priorities to certain business relationships and low priorities to 
others. It also entails getting equal priorities from the corresponding counterparts with which the focal firm interacts in those 
relationships (op. cit.: 202). In order to attribute such priorities, the focal firm employs some criteria. “Companies always 
have, explicit or only implied, principles for giving priority between existing relationships (…).” (op. cit.: 264). The ‘degree 
of trust and commitment exhibited by the counterpart’ - somehow inferred from its behaviour - can guide the focal firm in the 
decision to prioritize business relationships (for instance, a higher priority assigned to relationships with trustworthy and 
commited counterparts) (op. cit.: 265). In our opinion, one very reasonable criterion used by the focal firm can be the 
‘perceived relationship significance’ (either actual or potential).   27
Accordingly, a mixed relationship posture
15 must be effected (Gadde and Snehota, 2000). In 
this respect, adopting a combination of low- and high-involvement relationship postures (i.e., 
attributing lower priorities to lowly significant business relationships and higher priorities to 
highly significant ones, hence committing to these lesser and greater amounts of resources 
respectively) is advocated as the best way for the focal firm to ‘make the most’ of its diverse 
business relationships (op. cit.). Araujo et al. (1999) also argue that the focal firm should 
intendedly engage in both low and high resource-demanding business relationships with 
counterparts, albeit the recent apologia for the latter ones - note the increasingly widespread 
contention that ‘partnering (with suppliers and customers) is always beneficial’ (see, e.g., 
Sheth and Sharma, 1997, Campbell and Cooper, 1999). The message is clear: business 
relationships should be handled in varied ways, according to their (actual or potential) 
significance for the focal firm, i.e., relationship differentiation is often advised (Ford et al. 
1998). 
Typically the focal firm is strongly committed to those business relationships it considers as 
being highly significant (currently or in the future). Such relationships, usually high-
involvement ones, are sure to have taken a long time and many efforts to develop and, 
consequently they may be extremely difficult to replace (Ford et al. 1998, Hakansson and 
Snehota, 1995). Even if substitute business relationships (either actual or potential) do exist, 
these are probably not significant to the same extent (e.g., because their benefits are perceived 
as comparatively lower or sacrifices greater). A low-involvement posture, on the contrary, is 
likely to be adopted by the focal firm in those business relationships judged low in 
significance. 
Notoriously, (both actual and potential) relationship significance must be continually and 
deliberately assessed if the focal firm aims to manage effectively and efficiently its business 
relationships (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). Differentiation with regard to relationship 
posture - essentially network management (Ritter et al. 2004) - can only be achieved if the 
focal firm understands which of its business relationships currently are (or will be, in the 
future) significant, to what degree, and more importantly why. 
                                                 
15 The focal firm’s relationship posture (i.e., its degree of involvement in a business relationship) may be expressed as high or 
low, according to (i) the extent of adaptations made and (ii) the intensity of existing activity links, resource ties, and actor 
(individual) bonds (Gadde and Snehota, 2000). “Increased involvement makes sense only when the consequently increased 
relationship costs [and overall sacrifices] are more than offset by relationship benefits.” (op. cit.: 310). Diverse degrees of 
involvement are likely to lead to different relationship benefits and sacrifices (Gadde and Snehota, 2000, Araujo et al. 1999). 
Despite surely requiring greater sacrifices, high-involvement business relationships typically allow the focal firm to obtain 
(currently or in the future) higher benefits than those captured in low-involvement ones (Araujo et al. 1999).   28
Only by disclosing the determinants of relationship significance, will emerge the 
indispensable understanding concerning the (individual and collective) management of 
business relationships. That the former is seldom (if ever) completely articulated helps to 
explain why the latter is yet, within Industrial Network Theory, far from perfect. That 
invaluable understanding can, for instance, compel the focal firm to reinvest in a business 
relationship expected to become even more significant in a near future or instead divest if that 
relationship is perceived as being currently insignificant. We believe that managerial 
guidelines on relationship and network management can only be rightly given when the 
underlying reasons for relationship significance are fully known and grasped. In a similar 
vein, Hakansson and Snehota (1995: 125) claim that “(…) without some insight about which 
links [i.e., business relationships] are critical (…), management actions can become 
counterproductive and produce undesired effects”. 
This paper probes into relationship significance. Its main intent is both (i) to make explicit the 
largely inarticulated network-based rationale on relationship significance and (ii) to 
tentatively reflect upon the thoroughness of the arguments comprising such rationale. In doing 
this, we aim to be contributing something to understanding and indirectly to practice, since 
the improvement of the practice of industrial marketing and purchasing requires a better 
theoretical grasp of business firms, relationships, and markets (Wilkinson, 2001). Wilkinson 
and Young (2002: 127) assert that “(…) by extending and improving firms’ understanding 
and sensitivity regarding relationship and network issues, better performing firms and 
networks will emerge (…)”. 
 
   29
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We have here articulated the presently dominant albeit largely implicit network-based 
arguments on relationship significance. And the completeness of these arguments was 
afterward the object of a tentative cogitation using a (deemed appropriate) competence-based 
viewpoint. 
Our main points are the following. Arguably, the sufficient conditions supporting the 
relationship significance proposition have not been yet outlined. As a result, relationship 
significance is not thoroughly explained by the current state-of-art of Industrial Network 
Theory. The fact that the focal firm appropriates relationship value and the fact that 
relationship benefits and sacrifices are respectively greater and/or lower than the ones 
expected or ensuing from alternative business relationships, both seem but necessary 
conditions for relationship significance. 
The pure network-based arguments underlying relationship significance do not contemplate 
the (partly overlooked) inside of the focal firm, in particular the impact of business 
relationships on what it competently does within and across vertical boundaries, because they 
are naturally concerned with the focal firm’s outside (especially its context), and consequently 
only with the influence on what it gets done by others of business relationships (Hakansson 
and Johanson, 1992). We conjecture that the network-based rationale on the relationship 
significance should be supplemented with arguments borrowed from Competence-based 
Theories of the Firm (Penrose, 1959, Loasby, 1998). Still, no claim for the completeness of 
justifications on relationship significance can logically be made, even with those 
supplementary arguments. Nevertheless, a contribution towards such completeness is here, at 
least in our view, incipiently attempted. 
This paper pretends to contribute to the extension of Industrial Network Theory. We expect 
future empirical research to provide clear evidence of relationship significance justified by 
competence-related reasons, thus corroborating our main contentions. 
The endless quest for better theory is a basic instinct in every researcher and scholar, 
whatever its field of study is (Van de Ven, 1989). Instead of being merely theory users, 
researchers and scholars should assume the key role of theory developers. In this respect, the 
current state-of-art of any theory should always be challenged, rather than simply (re)asserted 
(Whetten, 1989). Professor Hakan Hakansson, one of the founders and most prominent 
fledge-bearers of Industrial Network Theory, has vigorously contended: “As researchers, we   30
need to believe that we can be wrong. (…) Challenging, instead of accepting, can be an 
enthusiastic route. It makes you move on (…)”.
16 Proposing solutions is an inherent 
responsibility of those who raise criticisms to theory (Whetten, 1989). We tried to provide a 
possible solution here. Like many other researchers, our ultimate objective is to contribute to 
an even better Industrial Network Theory. 
 
 
                                                 
16 An assertion proferred during a discussion period following one of the presentations made in the 1
st IMP Doctoral 
Consortium that took place at Odense, Denmark (31
th of August and 1
st of September, 2004), attended by the first author.   31
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿￿&￿ ￿ # $ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ !￿ ￿ !￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿   4 ￿ !" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
* 5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿￿&￿ ￿ # $ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ 5 ￿
: ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ = ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 > ￿ ￿￿ * ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿￿’ ￿ ? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ 7 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ &￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 2￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿   ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿￿’ ￿ ? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’ ￿ ￿￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿&￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿. ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿￿
’ ￿ ? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
) ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿’ ￿ ? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ % ￿
&￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ @￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿’ ￿ ? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿= ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿> ? @ A B ￿C D D B E ￿￿ ￿ ￿- * 1 ￿:￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ; < ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿% ( ( ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ A ￿￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿. ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿% ( . ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ A ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 6 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿. ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ F ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿% ( / ￿
&￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿’ 6 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿+ ￿ # $ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿/ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿￿= ￿ # ￿ ￿? ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿% ( ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ 8 $ ￿ ￿ ￿ B ￿ ￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ 4 ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
= ￿ # ￿ ￿? ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿% ( 5 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿&￿ A ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿B ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿- ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ * % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿￿ = ￿ # ￿ ￿? ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿% ( 7 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ !" ￿ ￿ # $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ &￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿2￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿G ￿￿￿￿   ￿ ￿? ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿% ( ￿￿
: ; # ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿&￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿4 ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ F ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿   ￿ ￿? ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿% ( ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ C ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ &￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ 6 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ > ￿ ￿￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ , ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ # ￿ ￿ ? ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿% ( % ￿
&￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ 6 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ + ￿ # $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ # ￿ ￿ ? ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿% ( ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ !￿ ￿ !￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿   4 ￿ !" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ , ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
* % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ * 5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿￿
￿ # ￿ ￿ ? ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿% . ( ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿. ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ # ￿ ￿ ? ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿% . . ￿
￿ ￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 8 * / # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ 8 ￿ ￿ ￿? ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿% . / ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 6 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿H ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿- ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿- ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
2￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿￿￿ ￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿% . ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ < ￿ ￿&￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿H ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿% . 5 ￿
￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ > ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ !￿ ￿ !￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿I￿￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿% . 7 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ &￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
￿￿￿% . ￿￿
’ ￿ ￿ ￿ 8 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿: ￿ 9 ￿ ￿&￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 ￿
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